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ABSTRACT 
PERSISTENT AUTHORITARIANISM IN PERSIAN GULF 
MONARCHIES 
How Rentier States and Sunni Ulama Coalesced With Each Other 
By 
Saeideh Adampira 
Stable system of Persian Gulf Monarchies after Arab Spring brought more questions to 
scholars who have been working on non-democratization in the Middle-East. When it comes 
to non-democratization of these countries one element should be considered as one of the 
major elements and it is Petrodollars. The rentier nature of these countries has enabled the 
monarchs to build a neo-patrimonial system of governments which works properly with 
Sunni Ulama. What has caused this system runs by now is financial structure of Sunni Ulama. 
Sunni Ulama as opposed to Shiite ones don’t enjoy financial independency which stems from 
lack of Hidden Imam doctrine in Sunni’s system of beliefs. The result of such a coalition for 
Persian Gulf monarchies has been more political stability. 
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Figure 1. Political map of Persian Gulf Monarchies 
 
Source: Map courtesy of University of Texas Libraries, Accessed May 02, 
2014,http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-192062619-
middle_east_pol_2008.jpg.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 The Persian Gulf Monarchies (PGM) - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) -“…account for 37 percent of all known crude oil reserves, 
[and] 25 percent of all known natural gas reserves”1 which make them so crucial to the world 
economy. But their anachronic political system has made them a controversial matter in 
world politics. 
 After the “third wave” of democratization2 that everybody expected democratization 
would spread over the Middle-East as well, the stable autocratic regimes of the region made 
many scholars to carry research projects on the reasons of non-democratization in the 
Middle-East. A group of scholars like Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington believe that 
the region’s peculiarities, Islam in particular, are the main constraints to democracy3. 
 Another group of scholars like Giacomo Luciani and Michael Ross argue that the 
problem stems from oil.4 According to them, since the region’s states have access to 
petrodollars, they are able to “buy off” people in exchange for democracy by distributing oil 
wealth. During Arab Spring, some taken financial policies by PGM, brought back all those 
discussions on the role of oil. Saudi Arabia rulers (Feb/Mar 2011) ensured spending $130 
                                                 
1 Cristopher Davidson, After the Sheikhs: the coming collapse of the Gulf monarchies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 42. 
 
2 Samuel P. Huntington categorizes the world democratization process into three waves. The first wave 
refers to democratization in North America and Europe which happened in the 1880. The second wave 
happened between 1945 and 1970, and the third wave began around 1975 in Latin America and Eastern 
European countries. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). 
 
3 Francis Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man (New York: Avon Book, 1993); and Samuel P. 
Huntington, “The clash of civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22. 
 
4 Giacomo Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework” in The Arab State, ed. 
Giacomo Luciani (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 65. ; Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder 
Democracy?” World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 325. 
5 
 
billion on their citizens throughout next years5 which was larger than its total budget in 
2007.6 Bahrain provided $2,660 for each family and Kuwait issued $3,500 in cash for each 
citizens.7 “The UAE government has…committed to spending $1.6 billion on infrastructure 
in the poorer…emirates.”8 Sultan Qaboos (king of Oman) promised a $2.6 billion package of 
benefits to his people.9 But Arab spring initiated a new phase in the region’s studies: 
understanding why these monarchies are resilient. 
F. Gregory Gause III and Sean L. Yom introduce an interesting method to answer this 
question. They believe that PGM could have survived over the years by taking different 
strategies.10 These strategies are “cross-cutting coalitions”. These coalitions enable 
incumbent regime to have a better control over the system. They change these coalitions from 
time to time and in different conditions, subsequently, provide this opportunity for 
themselves to pass crisis. 
Different coalitions have been mentioned by scholars, from military coalitions to 
religious ones. Surprisingly, when it comes to religious coalitions, they simply mention that 
PGM have subdued the religious clerics and made them the state’s employees in exchange for 
religious legitimacy. What has been remained vague here is that how they could do that? And 
                                                 
5 F. Gregory Gause III, Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East, No. 63 (USA: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2011), 6. 
 
6 Steffen Hertog,“The costs of counter-revolution in the GCC” Foreign Policy, May 31, 
2011, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/31/the_costs_of_counter_revolution_in_the_gcc.  
 
7  Mohammed El-Katiri, The future of the Arab Gulf monarchies in the age of uncertainties (report, 
ARMY WAR COLLEGE CARLISLE BARRACKS PA STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, 2013), 8, 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA583955 (accessed May 02, 
2014). 
  
8 Steffen Hertog, “The costs of counter-revolution in the GCC”. 
 
9 Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher, Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), 18, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/arab_monarchies1.pdf   
 
10 Sean L.Yom and F. Gregory Gause III, “Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang on.” Journal 
of Democracy 23, no. 4 (2012): 74. 
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why the Shah of Iran couldn’t take the same strategy to prevent Islamic revolution in 
1979(knowing he had access to petrodollars as well)? Answering to these questions is the 
main purpose of this thesis. This thesis, by comparing Shiite doctrine (the branch of Islam 
exercising in Iran) with Sunni doctrine (the branch of Islam exercising in PGM), identifies 
differences between these two branches of Islam (emphasizing on different financial structure 
of Ulama11) and will provide an extra explanation for resilient autocratic regimes in PGM. 
The first part is a critical review of the literature on reasons of non-democratization in 
the Middle-East. This part presents a gap in the literature that this thesis is going to bridge. 
The second part first, compares Sunni doctrine with Shiite one to identify those differences 
impacting resiliency of the monarchs. Then it bridges the existing gap in the literature which 
is the main argument of this thesis. The final part as usual is the conclusion part which here 
renders more questions for the next researches. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
                                                 
11 Ulama is the term used for calling religious scholars in Islam who are in charge of interpreting 
Islamic rules, this term is plural and its singular form is Alim. 
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PART I. A Critical Review of Literature on the Resilience of the 
Persian Gulf Monarchies 
 
I.1. Introduction 
 
Non-democratization in the Middle-East has been a long debate over years especially 
after the “third wave” of democratization in the world. Different approaches have been taken 
to address the problem, from time-series data analysis emphasizing the role of oil, to 
comparative analysis with other regions showing cultural deficits. 
Theoretical jobs in the field could be classified into two approaches: political 
economy approach and political culture approach. The former group believe that the problem 
stems from oil, for example Thomas L. Friedman in his article “The First Law of 
Petropolitics”12 published in foreign policy, says “The price of oil and the pace of freedom 
always move in opposite directions”.13 The latter group attributes the problem to the region’s 
peculiarities such as religion, traditions and social structure. For instance, Francis Fukuyama 
mentions “Islam has stood as a major barrier to democratization”.14  
When it comes to the Middle-East democratization, there is no consensus among 
scholars on causes of the problem. There is a large number of scholarly works on the issue 
both in terms of argument and counter argument. The first section of this part is on a critical 
review of the political economy approach toward non-democratization in the Middle-East in 
which Rentier State Theory (RST) is the main argument, and the second section goes through 
a critical review of the political culture approach. The last section is about a gap in the body 
of literature which this thesis is going to bridge. 
                                                 
12 Thomas L. Friedman, “The first law of Petropolitics.” Foreign Policy 154, no. 3 (2006): 28. Also 
available at this link: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/04/25/the_first_law_of_petropolitics  
 
13  Ibid. 
 
14  Francis Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man, 347. 
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I.2. Political Economy Approach  
 
 The first economist talked about Rentier State (RS) in a way we understand the 
concept today and use it, was Hussain Mahdavy15 who discussed this concept in the pre-
revolutionary Iran’s context. He showed how nationalization of oil industry had affected the 
structure of Iran’s economy and its growth. But RST become a benchmark for study Arab 
countries and authoritarianism in the Middle-East after publishing two articles by Giacomo 
Luciani and Hazem Beblawi16 in which they argued those states earn a huge share of their 
revenues-called rents-directly from abroad, have different political dynamic comparing to 
those ones earn their revenues domestically (possessing productive economy). 
 Beblawi defines rent as “the income derived from gift of nature”17 which in the 
Middle-East context usually refers to income from exporting oil and gas. There is another 
kind of rents called “strategic rents” which are in the form of foreign aids’ payments. These 
payments usually are paid as military or development assistant.18 All these revenues accrue 
directly to the state and “free the state from the need of raising income domestically”19.  
 Consequently, “the predominant function of the state”20 changes from a redistributive 
state into a distributive one. In a redistributive state -“production state”-, the state collects 
                                                 
15 Hussein Mahdavy, “Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of 
Iran,” in Studies in Economic History of the Middle East: from the rise of Islam to the present Day, ed. M. A. 
Cook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 428. 
 
16 Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World” in The Arab State, ed. Giacomo Luciani 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 85. ;and Giacomo Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States: 
A Theoretical Framework”. 
 
17 Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World”, 85. 
 
18 For example: USA payments to Egypt’s army or those aids which are paid to Jordan and Lebanon for 
developing economic programs by Persian Gulf Monarchies. 
 
19 Giacomo Luciani “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework”, 71. 
 
20 Giacomo Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework”, 71. 
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taxes from society, redistributes it, and in return has to be responsive to the society. On the 
contrary, a distributive state -“allocation state”- doesn’t need to be responsive to the society 
because it earns its required income directly from abroad and “buy[s] off” the nation in 
exchange for a portion of the rents at the expense of democracy: no representation without 
taxation. In other words, the end product of such a political dynamic - Rentierism - is an 
undemocratic system like those ones in the Middle-East especially PGM. Jill Cristal (1990) 
investigates the effect of oil in Kuwait and Qatar (the way it has changed political system and 
state institutions). He argues authoritarianism is the result of Rentierism.21 Camilla 
Sandbakken (2006) and Robert J. Barro (1999) both argue in the same way.22  
According to Luciani, as far as the state has access to that much financial resources to 
run such a “welfare” system, there is no demand for change on the part of citizens except for 
those groups which have not received enough benefits or those ones didn’t accept such a 
system in general whom usually are repressed by repression apparatus available to the state. 
The problem emerges when the state doesn’t have access to that much rents to run the system 
as before. In this condition the probability of regime change into democracy will increase.23 
Rex Brynen (1992)24, Roger Owen, Abdelbaki  Hermassi, and Volker Porthes (1994)25 all in 
                                                 
21 Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 
22 Camilla Sandbakken, “The Limits to Democracy Posed by Oil Rentier States: The Cases of Algeria, 
Nigeria and Libya,” Democratization 13, No. 1 (2006): 135. ; Robert J. Barro, “Determinants of Democracy,” 
Journal of Political Economy 107, No. 6 (1999): S158.     
 
23 Giacomo Luciani, “The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization,” in Democracy 
without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, ed. Ghassan Salame (London: I. B. Taurus, 
1994), 130.; Giacomo Luciani, “Economic foundations of democracy and authoritarianism: the Arab world in 
comparative perspective.” Arab Studies Quarterly 10, No. 4 (1988): 457. ; Giacomo Luciani, “Oil and Political 
Economy in the International Relations of the Middle East.” In International Relations of the Middle East, ed. 
Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 103. 
 
24 Rex Brynen, “Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of 
Jordan.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 25, No. 01 (1992): 69.   
 
25 Roger Owen, “Socio-economic Change and Political Mobilization: the case of Egypt.” in Democracy 
without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, ed. Ghassan Salamé (London: I. B. Taurus, 
1994):183. ; Abdelbaki Hermassi, “Socio-economic change and political implications: The Maghreb.” in 
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separate case studies of the region mention that fiscal crisis would start political liberalization 
process. This argument is confirmed by Limongi et al. (1997).26 They argue that economic 
crisis will lead to regime change in both democratic and autocratic systems. According to 
Kaufman and Haggard (1997)27, financial crisis increases the probability of regime change 
because it reduces available resources to elites to survive.  
Michael Ross (2001)28 opens another line of argument in the literature. He asks 
whether there is any relation between natural resources and regime type. He deploys a time-
series cross-national data set from 113 countries (1971-1997) and argues there is a strong 
positive correlation between being oil exporter and having autocratic regime which is not 
restricted to Middle-East. He examines three mechanisms (“Rentier effect”, “Repression 
effect”, “Modernization effect”)29 by which oil affects the political system and prevents 
democratization.30 Wantchekon (2004), Hegre and Sambanis (2006), Papaioannou and 
Siourounis (2008), Goldberg et al. (2008), Teorell (2010), Aslaksen (2010), and Ramsay 
(2011) all confirm the argument by Ross. They maintain that natural resources not only work 
as an impediment to democratization but also fuel authoritarianism.31 Wright et al. (2012) 
                                                                                                                                                        
Democracy without Democrats?, ed. Ghassan Salamé (London: I. B. Taurus, 1994): 227. ; Volker Perthes, “The 
private sector, economic liberalization, and the prospects of democratization: The case of Syria and some other 
Arab countries.” in Democracy without democrats?, ed. Ghassan Salamé (London: I. B. Taurus, 1994): 243.  
 
26 Neto Limongi, Fernando Papaterra, and Adam Przeworski, “Modernization: Theories and facts.” 
World politics 49, No. 2 (1997): 155. 
 
27 Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, “The political economy of democratic transitions.” 
Comparative Politics no. 3 (1997): 263. 
 
28 Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, No. 3, (2001): 325.  
 
29 Ibid. 
 
30 “Rentier effect” already discussed in this section. Ross defines the rest two effects as follow: 
Repression effect refers to a situation in which the state spends oil revenue on security and repression forces and 
by them suppresses any objection; Modernization effect is slow pace of required social changes for having 
democracy in oil exporting countries.   
 
31  Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon, “Resource wealth and political regimes in Africa” 
Comparative political studies 37, No. 7 (2004): 816. ; Havard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, “Sensitivity 
analysis of empirical results on civil war onset.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, No. 4 (2006): 508. ; Elias 
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indicate that oil wealth helps autocrats to stay in office by reducing the risk of being ejected 
by rivals. Dictators by increasing military spending, discourage hidden partnerships 
conducive to regime breakdown.32 Smith (2004) by using a “cross-sectional time-series data 
[set] from 107 developing states between 1960 and 1999”33, argues oil wealth enhances the 
longevity of regimes in general but it doesn’t affect regime type.34 Here is where the problem 
regarding all the above arguments arises.  
Countries such as Norway, USA, and UK are democratic despite being oil rich. In 
addition to these countries which had democratic system in the time of oil exploration, there 
are countries such as Botswana, Indonesia, and Mexico which turned into democracy in spite 
of having natural resources. Dunning (2008) criticizes Ross and argues natural resources’ 
impact is conditional and other effective factors such as religion, social structure, traditions, 
system of beliefs, and previous democracy experience should be considered. He takes 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Botswana, and Chile as case studies and by using time-series data set 
shows oil is positively correlated to democracy in Latin America.35 Even Michael Ross (2009) 
in a revised unpublished paper shows that the relation between oil and autocracy stay cogent 
in the Middle-East contrary to other regions like Latin America. He says those who blame 
                                                                                                                                                        
Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis, “Economic and social factors driving the third wave of democratization.” 
Journal of Comparative Economics 36, No. 3 (2008): 365. ; Ellis Goldberg, Erik Wibbels, and Eric Mvukiyehe, 
“Lessons from Strange Cases Democracy, Development, and the Resource Curse in the US States.” 
Comparative Political Studies 41, No. 4-5 (2008): 477. ; Jan Teorell, Determinants of democratization 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Silje Aslaksen, “Oil and democracy: More than a cross-
country correlation?” Journal of Peace Research 47, No. 4 (2010): 421. ; Kristopher W Ramsay, “Revisiting the 
Resource Curse: Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil, and Democracy.” International Organization 65, No. 3 
(2011): 507. 
 
32 Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz, and Barbara Geddes, “Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival.”(Working 
paper, Pennsylvania State University, 2013). Preliminary version downloadable from: 
http://www.personal.psu.edu/jgw12/blogs/josephwright/OilStability9.pdf. 
 
33 Benjamin Smith, “Oil wealth and regime survival in the developing world, 1960–1999.” American 
Journal of Political Science 48, no. 2 (2004): 232.   
 
34 Ibid. 
  
35 Thad Dunning, Crude democracy: Natural resource wealth and political regimes (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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Islam as the major barrier to democracy should know that the problem is oil not Islam36 and 
to some extent confirms Dunning’s argument on conditionality of oil effect. Smith and Kraus 
(2005) carry a case study on Congo, Ecuador, Nigeria, Trinidad, and Venezuela. They discuss 
there are mechanisms through which oil affects democratization. These mechanisms 
themselves are affected by democratic social requisites and historical traditions. According to 
them, changing regime into democracy in Trinidad, Venezuela, and Ecuador is a good reason 
for inferiority of oil role compared to other involving factors in different contexts.37 In the 
same line, Michael Herb in a paper published in 2005 mentions presence of democracy in 
Latin America and Caribbean resource rich countries is a confirmation to the importance of 
other factors working beside oil in other regions.38 Finally, Haber and Menaldo (2011) in a 
disputable research paper argue being highly resource dependent is disassociated with 
authoritarianism. They go further and mention there is resource blessing which has been 
neglected by other scholars.39 
Consequently, attributing oil to non-democratization in the Middle-East without 
considering other factors is controversial. The role of oil in the region is undeniable, but it 
should be analyzed with other effective elements. What should be done is finding channels 
through which oil and other impacting factors work together to impede democracy, 
something which is the main purpose of this thesis. 
                                                 
36  Michael Ross, “Oil and Democracy Revisited” (Unpublished paper, Department of Political Science 
UCLA, 2009). Preliminary draft paper downloadable from: 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/Oil%20and%20Democracy%20Revisited.pdf. 
 
37 Benjamin Smith and Joseph Kraus, “Democracy despite Oil: Transition and Consolidation in Latin 
America and Africa.” (Manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of Florida, 2005) quoted in Thad 
Dunning, Crude democracy: Natural resource wealth and political regimes (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 59. 
 
38 Michael Herb, “No representation without taxation? Rents, development, and 
democracy.” Comparative Politics (2005): 297. 
 
39 Stephan Haber and Victor Menaldo, “Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of 
the resource curse.” American Political Science Review 105, no. 01 (2011): 1. 
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I.3. Political Culture Approach 
 
 A considerable number of scholars argue lack of democratization in the Middle-East 
refers to the region’s culture, religion, history, and social structures. The first and the most 
important matter of debate is Islam. 
 Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis believe that Islam is not compatible with 
democracy. Huntington in his famous article “The Clash of Civilization” published in 
Foreign Affairs (1993), asserts “Islam has bloody borders”.40 The advocates of this idea 
predominantly see the Islamic system of law (Sharia) as the main problem. Sharia combines 
the daily life of Muslims with religion. It does it by a series of rules and regulations which 
Muslims have to live with. These scholars argue Sharia law doesn’t encompass some 
concepts, and subsequently it makes problem in practice. According to Bernard Lewis the 
problem refers to the absence of individual rights concept in Islam.41 He explains western 
democracy originally derives from Roman law of legal person42, and Islamic law suffers from 
lack of such a concept.43 
 Ellie Kedourie is in the same boat. According to Kedourie (1994), western traditions 
include representational government and some concepts like state for nation which are 
structural.44On the contrary, there are no such concepts and conventions in Islam. He argues 
since Arabs tried many times and they couldn’t achieve democracy, it shows they are unable 
                                                 
40 Samuel P. Huntington, “The clash of civilizations?”. 
 
41 Bernard Lewis, Islam in history: Ideas, people, and events in the Middle East (Peru: Open Court 
Publishing, 1993). 
 
42 Legal person is defined as “an individual, company, or other entity that has legal rights and is subject 
to obligations.” Oxforddictionaries.com, s.v. “ legal person” accessed May 02, 2014, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/  
 
43 Bernard Lewis, Islam in history: Ideas, People, and events in the Middle East. 
 
44 Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab political culture (London: FRANK CASS & CO.LTD., 1994). 
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to understand democracy because “democracy is quiet alien to the mind-set of Islam”.45 This 
argument set generally maintains Islamic principles are opposed to “the separation of religion 
and state”, freedom, and civil rights. 
 All of these arguments could be put under one umbrella: “Orientalism”. Edward Said 
states, this title first used by Europeans and then by Americans to explain and investigate the 
Middle-Eastern people.46 This argument set tries to categorize the Middle-Eastern people 
under a certain concept: “other”. The “other” is used for an imaginary person or group. 
Civilized people (westerns) should scare this group (“other”) and consider them principally 
dissimilar to the rest of the people. Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis use this concept 
when they say these people shouldn’t be involved political issues because they are not worth 
it.47 
 A group of scholars like Nadav Safran tried to test the argument and confirm it by 
giving real case studies. He analyzes cultural change in Egypt and argues if the Egyptian 
cultural elites were rational, the country’s liberal experiment between 1919 and 1939 would 
has been successful.48 He argues rationalism was a necessity for the change and when the 
elites discarded it in favor of Islam, the outcome was disappointing for Egypt. He concludes 
the problem is Islam which is not compatible with liberal politics.49 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 1. 
 
46 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). 
 
47 Samuel P. Huntington, “The clash of civilizations?”; Bernard Lewis, “The roots of Muslim rage.” 
The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 3 (1990): 47. 
     
48 Nadav Safran, Egypt in search of political community: an analysis of the intellectual and political 
evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952. No. 5. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 
http://books.google.com/books.  
 
 49 Nadav Safran, Egypt in search of political community: an analysis of the intellectual and political 
evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952. 
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 Steven Fish mentions “Muslim countries are democratic underachiever”50 and argues 
the problem stems from subordination of women. According to him there is a positive 
correlation between women’s status and “democratic deficits”.51 Daniela Donno and Bruce M 
Russet in order to reexamine Fish’s reasoning, do a cross-national quantitative analysis and 
reach to a little bit different conclusion.52 According to them, Islamic countries are less 
susceptible to democracy and this impact is more robust in Arab countries than in non-Arab 
ones. They go further and explain there is a negative correlation between women equality and 
Islam particularly in Arab countries but they can’t find a relation between gender equality and 
regime type.53 
 The “Arab exception” has been tested by Alfred C. Stepan and Graeme B. 
Robertson.54 Using a data set between 1972 and 2000, they compare relation between 
“competitive elections and levels of economic development”. This comparison is between 
“Arab Muslim countries and non-Arab Muslim majority” ones. They conclude the problem is 
Arabs not Islam because non-Arab Muslim majority countries are “greatly over-achieving”.55 
Mustapha K. Al-sayyid also sees the problem more Arab connected and believes the problem 
doesn’t refer to ordinary people but to Arabs’ elites as well, and this is a general problem 
                                                 
50 M. Steven Fish, “Islam and authoritarianism” World politics 55, no. 1 (2002): 4. 
 
51 Ibid. 
 
52 Daniela Donno and Bruce M. Russett, “Islam, authoritarianism, and female empowerment.” World 
Politics 56, no. 4 (2004): 582. 
 
53 Ibid. 
 
54  Alfered C. Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, “An “Arab” More Than a “Muslim” Democracy 
Gap” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 3 (2003): 30. 
 
55 Alfered C. Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, “An “Arab” More Than a “Muslim”. 
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among Arabs.56 He investigates the reaction by Arabs’ elites to Saddam Hussein invasion to 
Kuwait, and discusses the Arabs’ nature of politics is undemocratic.57 
 In addition to these arguments, a set of scholars sees the problem structural. John D. 
Sullivan discusses that the bourgeoisie and civil society are not strong enough in the region.58 
Donald L. Horowitz argues tribalism in the region is an impediment to democracy because 
for ethnically diverse societies settling conflicts and achieving consensus is not easy. 59  
 Some scholars focus on the region’s monarchies and argue these monarchies enjoy 
their cultural legitimacy. According to these scholars, since these monarchies have a 
prolonged history in their territory, they have all those tools and elements that remain 
unchanged over time such as Islamic values, tribal form of organization, and inherited 
principles. Michael Hudson (1977), Jean-Pierre Filiu (2011), Marina Ottaway and Marwan 
Muasher (2011) all belong to this category.60 Elliot Abrams (2011) argues since these 
monarchies have not experienced “bloody repression” in their history, it is an indication of 
being legitimate.61 The other group argue that practical supremacy of the monarchs makes 
them not only have control over ongoing issues, but also have a proper and in time reaction to 
them. For instance, the monarch puts his family members in key posts and by spreading his 
relatives over governing system, controls the system and keeps it safe from any potential 
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threat. Or by offering concessions to opponents in time, the monarch prevents any public 
demonstration. So by being “above the fray of everyday politics” they have strong 
maneuvering power.62 Michael Herb (1999), Lisa Anderson (1991), and Zoltan Barany (2013) 
fall in this category.63  
But F. Gregory Gause III and Seal L. Yom (2012) argue those protests (online/on 
streets) seen over Arab spring in PGM show that monarchs doesn’t enjoy guaranteed 
legitimacy. Moreover, putting family members in key posts make any reform policy more 
difficult because they resist any change could affect their position.64 
 There are enough critiques of all above arguments as well. One of the most interesting 
ones is an argument by Malcom H Kerr. He argues,  
…the doctrine of Caliphate failed to provide a procedure of identifying, 
choosing, installing, and if necessary, deposing, the caliph. Nor did the 
doctrine of jurisprudence offer the means of officially ascertaining the 
consensus on a given point of law. This lack of procedural rules in Islam, not 
abstract theological ideas about individual rights and responsibilities, is thus 
considered the source of the Muslim inability to replace an authoritarian ruler 
and to arrive at a parliamentary democracy.65 
 
John L Esposito and James Piscatory argue a different point of view. They explain 
fundamental concepts such as consultation (Shura)66, Political accountability, and equality 
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exist in Islam67 and the problem is, not applying them by Muslims. Gran68 and Torrey69 by 
investigating Islamic roles and Koran give good hints on compatibility of Islam with 
rationalism. For instance, Torrey shows there are enough words in Koran which are used in 
trade and business activities which confirms that Islamic mind is familiar with rational 
choice.70 
 Mark Tessler takes a step forward and tries to give factual evidences by conducting a 
survey based on world values survey data from Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco.71 He 
asks public opinions about whether their Islamic orientation affect their attitude toward 
democracy. The results which are homogenous in all surveyed countries display “Islamic 
orientations and attachments have, at most, a very limited impact on views about 
democracy.”72 Fares Al-Braizat runs an empirical research to test Fukuyama’s claim. He 
conducts a comparative analysis using data accessible from World Survey Value and 
European Survey Value.73 He argues there is a negative and insignificant correlation between 
religiosity and “support for democracy” in all religions. He includes other variables and 
contends there is a strong negative correlation between “Human Development” and 
authoritarianism. Moreover, there is a significant negative correlation between religiosity and 
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“Human Development”. He concludes that only taking Islam to explain authoritarianism is 
misleading and we need to find phenomenon could explain it.74  
Furthermore, there are good examples among Islamic countries which have achieved 
striking degree of development and reasonably democratic way of governing such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey. Finally, Tunisia’s new constitution “which enshrines 
freedom of religion and women's rights” put all those arguments on Arabic/Islamic element 
into question.75 Finding effective variables and mechanisms by which they work, could 
contribute to better understanding of the region. 
I.4. The Literature’s Gap 
 
 In all above arguments, there is a gap: separating the oil/gas factor from other 
impacting factors. While these factors are intertwined in PGM and work hand in hand. The 
oil/gas or it’s better to say Rentierism is an important factor and must be considered in study 
of PGM because of two reasons: First, certain peculiarities of RS which make it different 
from other governing system and second, the long history of Rentierism in the region which 
has had a deep effect on social and political dynamics of the region.  
 Since a small group of society are engaged in rent production, the channels by them 
these rents are distributed in society have a key role in social and political dynamics of these 
countries. Rentier States have neo-patriarchal76 structure through which they distribute rents. 
Neo-patrimonial theory explains how “allocation state” uses petrodollars to handle elite’s 
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relationship in particular and the whole society in general.77 As it is said in Mathew Gray’s 
paper, 
… neopatrimonial theory argues for a particular style of leadership where a 
sovereign—a monarch or president—is at the center of an elite web, with 
subordinate elites that are submissive to the leader but between which the 
leader encourages competition. This arrangement suits a leader anxious to 
keep any potential rivals for power in check. These elites build their own 
patron-client webs further down the neopatrimonial system and into 
institutions and social units, and are a medium through which resources and 
political order are dispensed centrally to various groups and forces, and 
through which political information and requests for favors pass upwards to 
the higher elites and the sovereign. The neopatrimonial leader will, as 
necessary, foster a cult of personality and a public image of strong leadership 
to build a message of charisma and popularity, while usually conducting elite 
relations in an opaque, personal fashion that obscures and informalizes the 
political process.78 
 
 
All regimes are made up a small group of major elites who negotiate with others to broaden 
elites’ networks. They do this to keep the regime and to strengthen the conventional structure 
of benefits. But what makes the RS different is the unique role of the sovereign on the one 
hand, and his access to a huge amount of financial resources on the other hand. The sovereign 
decides how to distribute rents which leads to “polarization of society into a variety of 
interest groups”79. 
 For different interest groups, government has different distributional plan. The end 
product of such an unequally distribution system is creation a context for growing Rentier 
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mind80. Contrary to a productive economy in which an individual’s earning is a function of 
his contribution to the job, in a Rentier system the individual by “maneuvering…within the 
existing setup… [without need to] seeking an alliance with others in similar conditions”81, 
has this chance to earn what he doesn’t deserve. Therefore the social, political, and economic 
policies notwithstanding their similarity to global norms, act completely different in these 
countries. 
 The second reason which makes Rentierism an important factor in political and social 
dynamics of the region is the long history of Rentierism in PGM which doesn’t refer to the 
time of oil/gas exploration. As seen in Figure 2, rulers of the region enjoyed external income 
(rents) when they signed antipiracy treaties with Great Britain. Great Britain after colonizing 
India followed two goals in the region: First, keeping India safe from other European 
competitors; second, keeping the region’s seashores secure enough to follow its own 
economic purposes. By signing these treaties, Britain impeded local rulers to get involved 
with foreigners without its permission and it also controlled those tribes could making 
problem.82 Signing treaty with Britain and then exploring oil, changed the power equation in 
favor of the region’s rulers.83   
 
    Figure 2.First time treaties were signed with Britain by Gulf rulers 
                                                 
80 For better understanding of the phenomenon see Fahad Al-Zumai, “Kuwait’s political impasse and 
rent-seeking behavior: a call for institutional reform.” Kuwait program on Development, Governance and 
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Source: Rosemary Said Zahlan and Roger owen, “The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman”, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998), quoted in Sami Atallah, “6 The 
Gulf region: beyond oil and wars.” in Democracy in the Arab World: Explaining the Deficit, eds. Samir A. 
Makdisi, and Ibrahim Elbadawi, (New York: Routledge, 2011): 180.    
 
Saudi Arabia before signing these treaties for a long time enjoyed Zakat (pilgrimage taxes) which 
made the rulers financially independent. 
 This is why study non-democratization in PGM without including the Rentierism effect 
(separating the role of oil) would suffer from deficiency of reasoning. The job by Michael Ross 
notwithstanding critiques to it, have a strong point. At least, he introduces three channels (effects) by 
which oil impacts these countries, the same as Luciani and Beblawi. The jobs by Steven Fish and 
Malcom H. Kerr are interesting as well. They both try to find those cultural particularities could 
explain democratization deficiency in the region. But both groups fall into two extreme points of 
taken approaches in Middle-East studies. This thesis is going to bridge this gap by introducing those 
cultural peculiarities which cause oil performs differently in various contexts. 
 This thesis takes the argument introduced by F. Gregory Gause III and Seal L Yom as starting 
point to bridge the gap. They argue monarchies by making different “cross-cutting coalitions” have 
1915 
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stayed resilient.84 Having access to huge “hydrocarbon rents”, monarchies have enough financial 
resources to pay for these coalitions. But these “coalitions do not maintain themselves. Autocrats must 
constantly nurture their alliances with material patronage.”85 This is an important key in this thesis 
and in the next part I will discuss how this nurturing action works in PGM. Three of those coalitions 
which are related to this thesis’ argument (channels by which oil and other impacting factors work 
with each other) are: Military coalitions, Regional coalitions, Religious coalitions. 
 Monarchies’ relation with military forces is more sophisticated than it seems at first glance. 
First of all, military forces are highly paid thanks to petrodollars. Secondly, PGM usually hire their 
security forces from abroad who don’t ponder to repress protests.86 It is understandable because “in 
divided societies, where the regime represents an ethnic, sectarian, or regional minority and has built 
an officer corps dominated by that overrepresented minority, the armies have thus far backed their 
regimes.”87 They have tried to increase the cost of regime change for these forces: changing regime 
equals to being substituted by new forces and loosing that much financial resources. So they work at 
their best. 
 The most important regional coalition is establishing Gulf Cooperation Council in May 1981. 
GCC provides enough means for PGM to support each other in needed times. For instance, Oman and 
Bahrain which don’t have enough financial resources to “buy off” protests, got $20 billion fund from 
the wealthier members,88  or this coalition allowed UAE and Saudi Arabia to send 5000 troops to 
Bahrain in March 2011 to suppress protests.89 
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 Finally, the religious coalition which is the main debate of this thesis. Regarding this coalition, 
they simply mention that PGM made the religious clerics employees of the state. In this way, PGM 
brought religious clerics under control of the system and subsequently gained their religious support 
(religious legitimacy). Surprisingly, they don't consider what happened in Iran in 1979. At that time 
the Shah was as rentier as PGM and had access to that much Petrodollars. Why the Shiite Ulama 
could revolt against the Shah? And why such an Islamic revolution didn’t happen in PGM? Why Shah 
didn’t subdue the Shiite Ulama as PGM subdued Sunni ones? Of course there are many social, 
institutional, and cultural factors engaging any revolution, but why such a revolution happened in 
their northern neighbor while they have been able to prevent the same movement?  Answering to 
these questions helps to bridge mentioned gap. There is a difference between Sunni doctrine and 
Shiite one which causes oil acts differently in PGM as opposed to Iran. 
The next part is on difference between financial structure of religious clerics in Iran (Shiite 
Muslims) and in PGM (Sunni Muslims) which led these countries go through two divergent paths. 
This difference has caused the neo-patriarchy works better in PGM than in Iran (in 1979). The 
outcome of this difference has been resilient system in PGM and regime change in Iran.  
 
 
PART II. How RS and Sunni Ulama Coalesced With Each Other 
II.1. Introduction 
This part is the heart of this thesis. It argues how financial structure of Sunni Ulama 
affects their interactions with RS. Shiite Ulama enjoy religious taxes directly paid to them by 
people which makes them financially independent. On the contrary, Sunni Ulama don’t 
benefit such religious taxes. This difference has caused states of Sunni majority countries 
could subdue Sunni Ulama over time. 
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The outcome of this difference could be seen in Islamic Revolution happened in Iran. 
Shiite Ulama could revolt against the regime because they had that much required financial 
resources to lead that massive movement. Of course there are many factors involving 
revolutions in each society but this factor has been discussed by scholars as one of the major 
factors of Islamic revolution in Iran. Knowing the difference between Shiite system and 
Sunni one, gives us a mean to understand how oil factor performs differently in PGM and 
why Sunni Ulama have been acted as a preventive lever to potential protests in these 
countries. 
Explaining why Sunni Ulama and Shiite ones went through such divergent paths 
(having completely different financial structure) is beyond this thesis but the outcome of all 
those phenomena is distinct systems which are discussed later in this part.  
The first section of this part discusses on differences between Sunni doctrine and 
Shiite one. These two different doctrines cause financial structure of Ulama goes through two 
divergent paths. The second section bridges the gap between political economy approach and 
political culture approach toward resilient regimes in PGM. It does it by explaining how these 
two different financial structures of Ulama affect the oil factor and cause shaping a different 
relation between Rentier states and religious institutions. 
II.2. Shiite doctrine V.S Sunni doctrine 
 
The conflict between Shiite and Sunni stems from the death of Prophet Mohammad in 
632 C.E. and the struggle for his successor. The Sunni Muslims believe  
…that the first four caliphs --Mohammed's successors--rightfully took his 
place as the leaders of Muslims. They recognize the heirs of the four caliphs 
(Ali is one of those four caliphs) as legitimate religious leaders. These heirs 
26 
 
ruled continuously in the Arab world until the break-up of the Ottoman 
Empire following the end of the First World War.90  
 
On the contrary, Shiite Muslims believe Ali (the Prophet Mohammad’s cousin and son in law) 
in addition to the next eleven Imams91 (these eleven Imams all were Ali’s descendants) were 
the right successors of Prophet Mohammad. According to Shiite beliefs, it is a “historic 
injustice done to the house of Ali”.92 Apart from this, the main difference between Sunnis 
and Shiites related to this thesis’ argument stems from another issue. According to Shiite 
doctrine the twelfth Imam (Hidden Imam: Mahdi) disappeared in 941 C.E. and until his 
reappearance, Twelver-Shiite believers have certain duties. 
“In the absence of the Hidden Imam sovereignty lies in the hand of …Ulama”93 till 
his reappearance and they are in charge of reinterpreting the will of Hidden Imam. There is a 
hierarchical system among Shiite Ulama in which Marjaiya (Mujtahid)94 is posited at its top. 
It is possible that several persons (Ulama) take this title simultaneously. The Shiite believer 
has this duty to identify a living Mujtahid to follow. Then she must pay her religious taxes 
directly to her selected Mujtahid. Here is where the economic strength of Shiite Ulama comes. 
Joseph Eliash explains it very well: 
In the absence of the Hidden Imam, the legitimacy of any Muslim political 
regime, even that of a Twelver-Shi’i government, was denied. A significant 
development with far-reaching political consequences follows from this, 
namely, the duty of the Twelver-Shi’i believer to pay a tenth of his yearly 
income directly to the Mujtahids and not to the Twelver-Shi’i government, 
and another tenth to the poor among the descendants of Ali who practices 
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Twelver-Shi’ism, which also may be paid through the Mujtahids. In modern 
Persia, the payment of Khums gives the Twelver-Shi’i devines economic 
independence from the political ruler and thus enables them to exercise 
political power in addition to their direct religious influence among the 
masses.95 
 
So Shiite Ulama “always enjoyed a charismatic status by virtue of their attachment to 
the Hidden Imam” 96  in addition to such financial resources arising from this doctrine. 
According to Shiite doctrine, the ruler who is not from Ali’s descendant is not legitimate and 
there are “salient symbolic resources to justify resistance against unjust authority, and to 
legitimate religious leaders as competitors to the state.” 97 The most important symbolic 
resource is Imam Hussain (son of Ali) who was killed by Yazid Umayyad caliph. On the 
contrary, according to Sunni tradition “an existing Muslim regime [is] as legitimate [,] as 
long as the ruler doesn’t publicly reject Islam.”98 So over the years, the Sunni Ulama usually 
have had the rubber stamp role for protesting movements instead of initiating it. 
Sunnis have Messianic belief as well, but it differs from Shiite ones (in Shiite beliefs 
the Messiah is from house of Ali: the Hidden Imam). Lack of such a doctrine in Sunni branch 
of Islam has caused Sunni Ulama don’t enjoy the same independent financial system as 
Shiite ones do because Sunnis don’t pay for supporting the “Sayyids”99 or don’t pay “Sahme 
Imam” 100 . 101  Moreover, in Sunni doctrine a follower doesn’t have to follow a certain 
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Mujtahid. But on the contrary, a Shiite follower must “pick[s] a living Mujtahid to follow 
and abide his judgment”.102 According to those Sunni schools exercising in PGM “all human 
beings are under an obligation, to the measure of their individual capacity, to choose among 
the differing opinions offered by Ulama according to their detailed proofs. This position does 
not forbid Taqlid103, but seeks to restrict it to a minimum.”104 This is where the Shiite and 
Sunni Ulama’s source of power goes through two divergent paths. 
In Shiite system, a follower chooses a Living Mujtahid to follow and to pay him 
directly her own religious taxes. But a Sunni follower could switch among different Ulama 
and she is not obliged to pay those taxes. Over the years of bureaucratization in both Sunni 
and Shiite societies, the states have put “Awgaf” (religious trust) and religious institutes like 
mosques and schools, under their own control; but they couldn’t make Shiite Ulama totally 
dependent upon states. This is due to “Sahme Imam” religious tax. This tax is a holy issue 
and states are unable to cancel it (like Zakat) till the return of the Hidden Imam (e.g. in Saudi 
Arabia Zakat was cancelled in 1972, although before that it was paid to government not to 
Ulama). This difference has caused that Sunni Ulama “usually acting as tools or minor allies 
of more powerful classes.”105 
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II.3. Bridging the Gap: How RS and Sunni Ulama Coalesced with Each 
Other 
 The neo-patrimonial structure of RS is the starting point of this section analysis. As 
already explained, neo-patrimonial system of leadership has a hierarchical structure in which 
an incumbent leader is posited at top and elites are subordinate to him in different levels. 
Here the incumbent leader has access to a huge amount of financial resources from abroad 
which enable him to exercise power first, by dividing the society into different interest groups, 
and then by distributing oil wealth -rent- proportionally among them. The following figure 
shows this process. 
  Figure 3. Neo-patrimonial system 
 
                    Source: drawn by author 
 
A group of these elites are religious elites: Ulama. This structure is like the PGM’s system 
and shows the nature of relation between Sunni Ulama and RS. 
 The Sunni Ulama’s relation with RS is the same as the above figure: a direct relation 
in which RS is positioned above the religious system because the religious system is paid by 
RS directly.106 Consequently they become subdued to the rentier incumbent or as Gregory 
Gause says the employees of the state. Each of those above elites – Elite A, Elite B- could be 
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a different group of Ulama and thanks to patrimonial nature of the system, the rentier 
incumbent could pay them proportionally based on its own certain goals. 
The relation between RS and Shiite Ulama is different as the following figure shows. 
In the Shiite system, the RS distributes oil rents in the society through different social and 
economic policies. The followers of the Shiite Ulama belonging to this society, subsequently, 
pay a part of those earned oil benefits as their religious taxes directly to the Shiite Ulama. So 
contrary to Sunni Ulama, the Shiite ones have a direct relation with people but an indirect 
relation with the RS thanks to their financial structure. 
                              Figure 4. Shiite Ulama relation with RS 
 
                      Source: drawn by author 
 
These systems (in both Shiite and Sunni societies) run until the both sides respect rules of the 
game, what the Shah of Iran didn’t. 
 The Shah which had access to huge financial resources due to oil price increase, 
started modernization plan in Iran. He attempted to bring all traditional sectors of the society 
such as production sectors, merchants, and bazaar under the state’s control. His 
industrialization plan passed and squeezed many sectors of the society. But the most 
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aggressive action by him was “the Shah’s steady efforts to exclude the Islamic clergy, the 
Ulama, from educational, legal, and welfare activities that historically had been theirs to 
perform.”107 He tried to wipe religion (Islam) out of the society knowing Iranians’ sensitivity 
to the Islamic rules. He broke rules of the game. All people who had offended by his 
modernization policies and were against those policies, gathered under the Shiite Ulama’s 
umbrella. Here the oil rents went against him and outcome of injecting petrodollars into the 
society was catastrophic for his regime. The more petrodollars he injected into the society, 
the more money went to the Shiite Ulama as religious taxes. The outcome of oil price 
increase, was gaining power on the part of Shiite Ulama who led people to revolt.108 
 PGM took another strategy. They have included religious clerics in the governing 
system. In all of these countries the legal system is based on Sharia law. “Religious court 
system in all of these countries have been placed under the control of the ministries of justice, 
with judges appointed by state authorities from among religious scholars.”109 So, on the one 
hand the RS pays the Ulama, on the other hand, it has their “Institutional support and 
ideological legitimation”: a direct, mutual relationship as we see in figure 3. Several facts 
should be considered here. 
 First, what enabled PGM to exercise such a system is the financial structure of Sunni 
Ulama which has provided enough ground for running this type of governing system. The 
Shah of Iran was unable to make the Shiite Ulama employees of the state. Even after Islamic 
revolution in Iran which religious clerics have merged into the governing system, one thing 
has not changed: the financial independency of Ulama resulted from Twelver-Imam doctrine. 
Today Shiite followers could pay their religious taxes by credit cards from all over the world. 
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So, the coalition between the system and religious institutions in PGM is the outcome of a 
mutual need. 
Second, the neo-patrimonial structure of the system has played an important role in 
keeping religious groups quiet and preventing broad objections by them. PGM have divided 
the Ulama into different groups and have put them in different posts based on their system’s 
needs. This strategy has enabled the RS to have different payments to different groups. This 
is justifiable and doesn’t leave any room for objections (different salary for different duties). 
The rentier mind knows that by maneuvering over the existing system could earn more, then 
a series of competitions would start within the system and the incumbent leader at top enjoys 
the end product of that: more stability. Petrodollars play an important role here. The 
incumbent leader has that much required financial resources to run such a system. The 
Mubarak’s regime in Egypt was rentier as well, but it didn’t have that much money to build 
such a sophisticated structure. The Sunni Ulama in Egypt didn’t publish Fatwa110 to support 
Mubarak, but for example “…in Saudi Arabia…Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Al al-Sheikh, the grand 
mufti, the highest religious official in the country, condemned the marches and 
demonstrations occurring in Arab countries as “destructive acts of chaos” plotted by the 
enemies of Islam…”111 and at the same time the Council of Senior Clerics (religious institute) 
declared that any demonstration is prohibited.112 Here we could see how the Sunni doctrine 
works in this system. Two different religious clerics issue their own statements to make sure 
providing a situation for a follower (whom could switch over different ideas) to take their 
desired order. Further, in rentier system they tried to play the traditional game to keep their 
position within the system. In return, by the patrimonial RS, 
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About $53 million was allocated to establish a bureau for the General 
Presidency for Religious Research and Ifta, including the creation of 300 jobs; 
$133.32 million for the renovation of mosques; $53 million to support the 
country’s Holy Quran Memorization Associations; $80 million for the Bureau 
of Call and Guidance at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call 
and Guidance; and $53 million to complete regional headquarters for the 
Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. Funding 
has also been provided to establish a Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) complex.113  
 
 
Here is what Gregory Gause argues: nurturing these coalitions from time to time by changing 
the available benefits to each group. 
As a result, religious coalition in PGM is the byproduct of two elements. First, oil 
which gives PGM enough financial resources. Second, the financial structure of Sunni Ulama. 
They both together enabled PGM to build this sophisticated structure. These two impacting 
factors work together and the absence of one of them would result in different outcome. 
Mubarak who didn’t have that much financial resources to build such a patronage structure, 
was unable to survive despite of having Sunni system, and Shah of Iran despite of having 
access to huge amounts of petrodollars couldn’t survive Shiite Islamic revolution. 
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PART III. CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis presents an explanation to persistent authoritarianism in the Persian Gulf 
Monarchies. It bridges existing gap in the literature. For a long time, scholars have discussed 
about oil/gas factor and cultural peculiarities (like Islam) as main barriers to democratization 
in the Middle-East. Surprisingly, they rarely assessed how these two major factors (oil and 
cultural peculiarities) work with each other and affect resiliency of the monarchs. This thesis, 
does this by investigating how the financial dependency of Sunni Ulama and neo-patrimonial 
structure of Rentier states has led to a strong coalition between the states and the Sunni 
Ulama. This Coalition has led to stable regimes in the Persian Gulf Monarchies. 
35 
 
Lack of Hidden Imam doctrine in Sunni branch of Islam has caused Sunni Ulama 
don’t enjoy financial independency as Shiite ones do. Sunni Ulama are directly dependent on 
the states but Shiite ones are directly dependent on people instead of the states. The outcome 
of this difference has been regime change for Iran (1979) and stability for the Persian Gulf 
Monarchies. The injected petrodollars by the Shah of Iran into the society went as religious 
taxes to the Shiite Ulama and empowered them to revolt against the regime. On the contrary, 
petrodollars in Persian Gulf Monarchies empowered the states to run a proportional system of 
benefits conducive to subordination of religious system. This diverse situation is end product 
of financial structure of Shiite Ulama versus Sunni ones. 
As this thesis shows, on the one hand, putting all Islamic countries in a bowel and 
discussing “Islam as a major barrier to democratization” is not a true way of analysis. On the 
other hand, Rentier State Theory alone could not explain what actually is going on in the 
region. In the region studies, what should be considered is finding channels through which 
these two important factors work with each other. The Persian Gulf Monarchies interestingly, 
have used one of the region’s peculiarities (The financial dependency of Sunni Ulama) to 
design a system in which religious clerics being under control. This strategy has helped them 
to survive oppositions by religious groups till now. 
 But this strategy is a double-edged sword. Although this coalition has worked 
successfully by now but the question is that for how long they will be able to run such a 
system. In these monarchies the legal system still is based on Sharia, but entering into global 
context and implementing development policies requires changing the rules. The simplest and 
basic issue is the situation of women in these countries.  
Still in these countries women are considered as second class citizens. In Saudi Arabia 
for example they are deprived of simple activities like driving car. The women Issue is the 
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most challenging issue in Islamic countries. These monarchs have been able to handle their 
relation with the Ulama by exercising Islamic law but what would happen if they have to 
change these rules? If they cross the red lines of Ulama, they would experience the same 
challenge as the Shah of Iran did? Knowing that they already have included religious clerics 
in the governing system and have put them in some key posts. To top it all, they have defined 
themselves as Islamic countries and have made it a part of their identity. Many Islamist 
groups within these countries still see them as protectors of Islam. The signs of such 
challenges have already emerged. For example in UAE “A growing number of Emiratis are 
unsatisfied with the indecent behavior of expatriate residents and tourists in public.”114  
In addition to the above problem, the instability of oil price is going to be another 
challenge. These countries even now suffer from incompatibility of real oil price with the 
price they need to run their system for a guaranteed time.115 While USA is getting ready to 
enter the oil market by extracting oil sands, the prospect of the market is not promising 
enough for these countries. When they don’t have that much financial resources to pay for 
these patronages, could they still keep these coalitions? 
This thesis showed these countries have been able to survive religious oppositions by 
now through taking discussed strategies. We see that how different Islamic doctrines could 
provide different challenges to incumbent regimes. Comparative analysis, the used method in 
this thesis, would be an appropriate method to analyze the region’s countries in order to find 
explanatory differences conducive to a better understanding of the region.  
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